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SUPRE'ME COURT OF NEW YORK.

-endo" and Pu rchaser- Wi dl-J'dqncnt,Licn of-Constructire.Noti'e-Ejctment-Scriff's Deed.-From the time of making a contract
for the sale of land. and more especially if the vendee enters into posses.
sion, and makes improvements on the premises. the vendor, as to the land,
becomes a trustee for the vendee, and the vendee, as to the purchasemoney. a trustee for the vendor. And until payment, the vendor has a
mere lien on the land, for the purchase-money: Smith vs. Gage.
The interest of the vendor, in such a contract, is not real estate, but
only personal estate; and in case of the vendor's death, the unpaid purchase-money is treated as only personal estate, and goes, not to his heirs,
but to his personal representatives: IR.
Where a vendor, who had executed various contracts for the sale of
land in a certain tract, devised to his son J.L. all his lands in that tract,
and also all contracts that had been entered into for the sale of any of
said lands, and all moneys which might remain due and unpaid thereon,
upon the purchasers' complying with the terms thereof, IHId, that it was
the intention of the testator to give to J.L. the moneys remaining unpaid
upon the land contracts, as money, and not to devise to him the title to
the lands, which was in the purchasers : Id.
A judgment against the holder of the legal title of lands sold by an
executory contract is not, under all circumstances, a lien to the extent of
the purclase-money unpaid at the time of its being docketed: .Td.
Such lien. if any. is always subject to the equitable rights of the party
in the occupation of the lands, under a prior contract to purchase the same
from the legal owner : Id.
And payments made by the purchaser. to the vendor or his assignee or
devisee or personal representative, after the docketing of such judgment,
but without actual notice thereof, and even after the sale, and the execution of the sheriff's deed. are as valid, against the grantee of the sheriff,
as if made before the docketing of the judgment: 1L.
What is known in law as constructive notice-such as the docketing
of the judgment, the sheriff's certificate of sale. and the recording of the
I From the Iou. 0. L. Barbour. Reporter; to appear in the '3th volume of his
Reports.
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purchaser's deed-is not notice to a purchaser of the executory contract,
from the vendee: Id.
Whatever may be the equitabl6 rights of a party in tha occupation of
lands held under a prior executory contract, they have preference ove6
the lien of a subsequently acquired or subsequently docketed judgment: Id.
Where a judgment is recovered against the vendor in an executory
contract'for the sale of land, and the vendee subsequently pays to the
vendor the balance of the purchase-money, without actual notice of the
judgment, he will be protected, and the judgment will not be a lien upon
the unpaid purchase-money, as against him: Id.
The possession of the vendee, under his contract as purchaser, is notice
to all persons who may subsequently become interested, in any way, in
the premises, not only of his possession, but of the terms of the contract,
and of all his existing rights under it: Id.
A subsequent judgment-creditor of the vendor is chargeable with notice
of the vendee's rights, and is therefore bound, in order to secure his lien,
to use all diligence in giving notice to the vendee, and in restraining him
from making any further payments on his executory contract :- Id.,
Ejectment is a legal action, in which the plaintiff can succeed only by
making out a legal title in himself, in the pursuit of a legal remedy.. if
the equitable title is in the defendant, and the only right the plaintiff can
claim is that of an equitable lien upon an equitable title, he must fail: Id.
A.sheriff's deed need not contain a recital of the particular execution
by virtue of which he sells real estate: .d.
Recording of Deeds-Mfemorandum of Alterations. -It is the duty of a

c6unty clerk to record the memorandum of alterations and interlineations
in a deed; and it is not erroneous for a judge to charge the jury that the
absence of any such -memorandum, in the record, is a circumstance for
their consideration in connection with the question of an alleged fraudulent insertion in the deed: Ieyer vs. Beyer.
Guaranty.-A guaranty of collection implies that- a note or other evidence of debt is good, or good and collectable against the principal debtors; and this means collectable by due course of law: Cady et al., E 'rs.,
vs. Shieldon et al.

Ordinarily, to test that question, it is necessary that the cudomary legal
proceedings should be resorted to: Id.
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Yet it is not absolutely indispensablethat legal proceedings should be
resorted to, if it otherwise satisfactorily appears that such proceedings
would be entirely ineffectual: Id.
When a mortgage is given, as collateral to the bond guarantied, it is
not indispensable that the holders of the bond should seek satisfaction out
of the mortgaged premises, by a foreclosure, if it appears that that remedy
would have proved fruitless: Id.
Breach of Promise to Marry; Action for; Evidence in.-In an action
by a female to recover damages for a breach of a contract to marry, the
judge allowed the plaintiff, after she had testified, without objection, to
the defendant's promise that she should not be any the worse for him, nor
come to any disgrace by him, and if she did he would marry her, to testify that she was pregnant by defendant at the time he abandoned her.
Held, that the evidence was properly received: Hotchkins vs. lodge.
A wrong done to the female, such as sexual intercourse with her, by
her alleged suitor, will not make a promise to marry, founded thereon, or
arising therefrom, invalid or inoperative. Such a promise is not liable to
the objection that it encourages immorality: Id.
It is not indispensable that a promise to marry should be express. It
may be implied from circumstances; and it may Test partly on both; that
is, on express words, and on conduct and acts reasonably leading to the
same conclusion: Id.
Long-bestowed and particular attentions, having apparently an honorable object, furnish sufficient evidence from which the jury may imply a
promise of marriage: Id.
Principaland Agent.-Where an agent is prosecuted, and a judgment
obtained against him, for an act done in obedience to instructions from his
principal, such act being done in good faith and under the belief that the
instructions were reasonable and the act lawful, he is entitled to reimbursement from his principal, for all the damages he has sustained : howle
vs. The Buffalo, New York and Erie Railroad Company.
And it is immaterial whether the act for which the recovery was had,
against the agent, was in fact lawful or unlawful; the instructions" being,
in either case, the proximate cause of action and recovery: 7d.
The settlement of the judgment, by the agent, after he has been charged
a execution, by giving his note for the amount, is a good payment of the
judgment: Id.
If the agent is charged in execution upon the judgment recovered
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against him, this is the highest satisfaction known to the law: and is equivalent to an actual payment by him, in money, of the judgment, for the
purpose of charging his principal with the liability for full reimbursement: .ld.
Agreeent.-The plaintiff agreed to deliver to defendants a force-pump,
for $60, promising that if the defendants could not make it operate, he
would take it away again; the defendants agreeing that if the plaintiff
would serid them such a pump, on trial, they would try it, after which, if
they liked it, they -would buy it. Held, that this was not a sale of the
pump, but a conditional agreement to purchase it at a future time: lfcDonald vs. Pierson.
Held, also, that the defendants were bound to try the pump within a
reasonable time; and that they having kept the same in their possession
for nearly two years, without making any trial of its sufficiency, or showing
any valid excuse for the neglect, the plaintiff was at liberty to treat the
condition as waived, and was entitled to recover the stipulated price of the
pump : d.
Held, fzrthet, that a trial of the identical pump was what the agreement
required, and no other test was admissible. Hence the opinions of mechanics and experts, who had pronounced the pump insufficient to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed, furnished no excuse to the
defendants for omitting to make a trial thereof: Id.
Judgment-Evidence.-Where, in an action upon a judgment, the defendant, by his answer, puts in issue the existence of a regular, valid, and
legal judgment, any evidence tending to show the judgment illegal or void
is competent. Hence, a certified copy of the judgment record, showing
that since the joining of the issue the judgment has been vacated, is admissible : .Kinsey/vs. Ford.
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.'

GuarantIy- Conitction.-The cardinal rule in the construction of all
instruments, guaranties included, is, "to read the writing," and, taking
its language in connection with the relative position and general purpose
of the parties, to gather from it, if you can, their intent in the questionable particular. If, thus considered, its language is equally susceptible of
either of two reasonable interpretations, that is to be adopted which makes
1 From

Hon. Samuel Ames, Reporter; to appear in the 4th volume of his Reports
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most strongly against the maker of the instrument, or party using the am
biguous words; and this rule, in application to guaranties, is quite compatible with another, that no one can claim under a guaranty who does not
bring himself fairly within its terms: Deblois vs. Earle.
Where the plaintiff, in an indenture of lease, by the words-" I agree
to and with the said J. E. H. to lease to him"-leased to J. E. H. certain
premises, and by thu same phrase agreed in the same instrument, at the
option of said J. E. H., to lease to him the premises for another year upon
the same terms and conditions, at a certain rent, payable at a certain time
named in the lease, and the defendant, by a covenant next following in
the instrument the stipulation for another year, agreed, "that in case the
said J. E. II. shall neglect or refuse to pay the aforesaid rent in manner
aforesaid, I will pay the same within ten days thereafter," Held, that the
defendant's guaranty applied to the second year's rent, as well as-to the
first: Id.
-Mortgage-in trust- Compensation of Mortgagee-JustAllowances-M1isrepresentationin Conditionsof Sales-Den urrer.-A mortgagee in trust,
with a power -f sale, may hold the mortgaged estate against the purchaser
of the equity as charged with the expenses of a sale by such mortgagee
attempted and discontinued in accordance with his trust and of obtaining
necessary legal advice in the execution of the trust, under the head ofjust
allowances; but, unless expressly stipulated in the mortgage, cannot bold
it charged with any commissions or fees for his own services : Allen vs.
Robbins.
Where the assignees of a mortgaged estate sold the equity, subject to
the mortgage, at auction, and in the conditions of sale described the mortgage as amounting to a sum certain, for principal and interest, but in the
same conditions allowed the purchaser ten days after the sale within which
'toexamine the title, promising to cure any objection to it, or to annul the
sale, and the purchaser long subsequent to the sale took from the assignees
a quit-claim deed, without warranty, of their title to the estate, subject to
the mortgage: Held, upon demurrer to a bill by the purchaser against
the assignees, to compel them to pay in his discharge certain expanses of
the mortgagee which formed just allowances to him under the mortgage,
that, as the bill charged no fraud in the assignees in their said misrepresentation, the above facts stated in it would not maintain a suit, either at
law or in equity: ITd.
Release under a loluntary Assignment-Smzday,.--The delivery of a
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rolcase by a creditor to an assignee under a voluntary assignment, who is
authorized by the assignor to receive it for him, is equivalent to a delivery
of the same to the assignor personally: Allen vs. Gardiner.
The execution of such a release by delivery on Sunday, is not void
under ch. 216, s. 7, of the Revised Statutes; not being labor, business,
or work, within the ordinary calling of either of the parties to it, prohibited by that section: Id.
Sole and separate use, Estate for what will create-Curtesyof Busband.-Although no particular form of words is necessary to create an
estate to the sole and separate use of a woman as against her present or
future husband, yet such words must be used in the lauignage limiting the
use, as clearly and unequivocally express the intent to exclude his marital
rights, and does not lqave that intent a matter'of doubt and speculation:
Nightingale et al.vs. Ridden et al.
Hence, where the guardian and brother of a feme sole who was under
age and contracted to be married, at her request, purchased an estate with
her.money, and took the deed to himself in fee, described therein as her
guardian, haben-dum "to him, his heirs forever, to and for the only proper
use, benefit, and behoof" of his ward, "her heirs and assigns-forever,"
and the covenants of warranty and for quiet enjoyment ran to him, "his
heirs and assigns, to and for the sole use, benefit, and behoof of her, her
heirs and assigns," it was held, that these words, merely, did not create a
'trust- for the sole and separate use of the ward, but, there being nothing
for the guardian to do under the provisions of the deed, the Statute of
Uses transferred the legal title to the ward, so as to admit her husband to
curtesy in her estate: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1

Set-off-Notice-Promissory lVote. -An overdue negotiable promissory
note of a plaintiff, indorsed to and held by the defendant before the
commencement of an action against him, is a proper subject of set-off.
although no notice that the defendant held the same was -given to the
plaintiff before the commencement of the action: Cook vs. Mills.
Insolvency-Action by Foreign Corporation.-A certificate of discharge
in insolvency is no bar to an action by a foreign corporation against the
payee of a note who indorsed it to them in blank before its maturity,
I From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in the 5th volume of his
L1
Reports.
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although the note itself was executed and made payable in this commonwealth, by a citizen thereof: Producers' Bank vs. Farnum.
Wrongful Acts by Persons acting separately-Joint Trespass-Action
against one.-If several different creditors, acting separately, without concert, and without knowing that they were employing a common agent, have
wrongfully caused their debtor to be arrested on their several writs, by the
same officer, who served the writs simultaneously, and by virtue thereof
committed the debtor to jail, where he was confined upon all of them at
the same time, they are to be regarded as joint trespassers; and full satisfaction received by the debtor from one of them is a bar to an action by
him against the others: Stone vs. Dickinson.
Conditional Promise-Btrdenof Proof.-If a written promise to pay
money is given with a condition providing that it shall be void upon the
happening of a certain event, the burden of proof, in an action against
the maker, is upon the defendant to show that the event has happened:
Thayer vs. Connor.
Collateral Securkly-Absolbte Bill of Sale intended for.-Taking a bill
of sale of personal property absolute in terms, but intended as collateral
becurity, amounts only to a pledge, which is lost by giving up the possession
thereof to the general owner, even though under restrictions as to the use
of it: Walker vs. Staples.
Attached Property-Action against Officer for loss of.-If attached
property, of which due care is taken by the officer or keeper, is stolen,
the officer is not liable for the loss : Dorman vs. Kane.
In an action against an officer to recover the value of attached property
which has been stolen, if evidence has been introduced to show that in
particular instances his keeper was careless in leaving the room in which
the property was kept with the door unlocked, he may show in r'eply that
it was the habit of the keeper to lock the door, when about to leave the
room: Id.
If a judgment-debtor whose property has been attached on mesne process
has paid the amount of the judgment, and informs the officer thereof, and
demands the return of his property before the expiration of thirty days
from the rendition of the judgment, and the officer, without asking for
delay or authority from the judgment-creditor to deliver up the property,
replies that it is lost and he cannot deliver it up, this is a waiver of any
right which he might otherwise have had for further time: Id.
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An officer is not made liable for the conversion of attached property,
by proof that it has been stolen from his possession: Id.
Statute of Frauds-Delivery and Acceptance-Duty of Judge whera
-5videnceinsufficent.-If the evidence to show a delivery and acceptance
uf goods, sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, is so slight that the
court would set aside any number of verdicts, finding such deliver- and
acceptance, that should be rendered upon it, toties guoties, it is the duty
of the judge to withdraw the case from the jury; and an exception lies to
his refusal to do so : Denny vs. Williams.
A delivery and acceptance of goods, sufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, can only be shown by some clear and unequivocal act; Id.
Jury Trial-Practice- Questions by Judge-Privileged Communications.-The presiding judge at a trial may inquire of the jury on what
ground they found their verdict, in the absence and- without the consent
of counsel; and their reply to such inquiry may be considered by this
court, in determining the materiality of questions presented on a bill of
exceptions: Lawler vs. Earle.
The owner of a building which has been set on fire may caution the
persbns employed by him therein, against a particular person suspected of
being the incendiary; and his statements to them, if made in good faith
for this purpose, are privileged communications, although they, contain an
unfounded criminal charge against the suspected person: -d.
County Commissioners,facts certified by, not traversable on Certiorari"Proceedings
of, not reversedfor technical lnaccuracy.-If county commissioners have certified to this court their proceedings in a case before them,
in compliance with the command of a writ of certiorari, the facts certified
by them are not traversable, nor is other evidence admissible to control or
contradict them, or to show that the judgment or decree of the commissioners ought to be reversed: .Mendon vs. Commissioners of Worcester.
If it appears from the whole record of the proceedings of county commissioners, as certified by them to this court, ii compliance, with the command of a writ of certiorari,that their decision of a question before them
was founded upon a consideration of adequate and uncontradicted evidence, and was substantially correct, and worked no injustice to anybody,
the proceedings will not be vacated, although the commissioners' view of
the law as to the burden of proof was not expressed with technical accuracy : Id.
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Slander-Burden of'Proof as to time of speaing.-In an actiou for
slander, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that the words
were spoken within two years before the suing out of his writ: Pond vs.
Gibson.
E-temption from Attachment-Gen. St. c. 133, s. 32.-Under Gen. Sts
c. 133, s. 32, machines of simple construction, moved by the hand or foot,
and used in the manufacture of boots, are exempt from attachment, although the owner employs a number of men under him in carrying on the
business, by whom the machines are generally used: Danielsvs. Hayward.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Right of Way by User-Presumption of Grant.-The use of a road
over the land of another, without permission or objection, is adverse, and
if enjoyed uninterruptedly for twenty-one years, gives a right of way:
Pierce vs. Cloud.
Without evidence to explain how it began, the enjoyment is presumed
to have been in pursuance of an unqualified grant; and the burden of
showing the contrary is upon the owner of the land: Id.
In an action of trespass for entering the plaintiff's field, over which
defendant alleged a right of way by user for more than forty years, the
plaintiff gave in evidence declarations of defendant that he held the right
of way by sufferance, though other declarations, inconsistbnt therewith,
were proved to the effect that he would stand upon his legal rights. The
court declined to instruct the jury, that the evidence, if believed, showed
that the way was used under favor and not adversely, and charged that
the declarations were insufficient to affect defendantes rights. On writ of
error, it was Reld, that as the declarations of defendant were equivocal
and inconsistent, they were not sufficient to repel the presumption of a
grant, and that the instruction of the court was not erroneous: Id.
Where the points of the plaintiff in error presented to the court below,
are answered with sufficient distinctness in the answers, when taken in connection with the general charge to the jury, it is not a ground for reversing
the judgment that-direct and unequivocal answers were not madeto each:
Id.
Constitutionality of the Act of March 13th 1862, authorizingthe Arrest,
&c., of Professional Thieves, &c.-The constitutional provision relative
I Frum Robert E. Wright, Esq., State Reporter; to be reported in the 6th-volume

of his Reports.
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to trial by jury was intended to preserve that right as it existed at the formation of our state government, and not to increase or extend it, and must
be construed with reference to the statutes that were in force in England,
and in the uravince of Pennsylvania, at the adoption of the first constitution
of the state: Byers and Davis vs. The Commonwealth.
The Act of March 13th 1862, authorizing the arrest of professional
thieves, burglars, &c., in the city of Philadelphia, and their commitment
to prison by the mayor, or public magistrate of the central station, is not
in conflict with the constitutional right of trial by jury, nor prohibited
by the ninth section of the bill of rights: .1d.
A eonviction by a magistrate under this act, which in describing the offence, follows the words of the statute,, and sets out the fact that the charge
was satisfactorily proven, is neither illegal or void: Id.
Answer of Court to Prayer for Instruction to Jury,, when sufficient.Accord and Satisfaction not valid without Performance.-In an issue
to ascertain how much, if anything, was due on a cautionary judgment,
the court submitted to the jury a que'stion, arising out of a settlement between the plaintiff and defendant and the giving of a note thereon by the
defendant, whether the note was received and accepted in satisfaction of
the judgment, or was only a liquidation of the amount due, without distinctly affirming defendant's points, to the effect that if the jury believed
the evidence, their verdict should be for the defendant. Bield, that as
the question was one of fact for the jury, the ruling of the court below
was not error: Schilling vs. Dorst.
Where the defendant agreed to build a house for the plaintiff within a
specified time, in consideration of a given sum, a release of all claims
against him including the judgment, and security for the performance of
the agreement, which the defendant gave, but did not. build the house,
the agreement and giving security under it, would not disehaige or satisfy
the judgment: the covenants between the parties constituted an entire
contract, with mutual and dependent conditions, and the'defendant could
not claim the satisfaction of the judgment, as part -of his. compensation'
after finishing the house, without performance of his covenants to build
it, notwithstanding the security given: -1d.
"Nephews and Nieces" of Testator, definition of-A testatrix by wilt
made a residuary bequest to "all my nephews and nieces." Held, that
only her own nephews and nieces were included, and not those of her
husband: Green's Appeal. Satterthwaite'sAppeal. Ma23 -PaulsEstate

